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INTRODUCTION 
The television landscape is changing.  New entrants in 
the form of Online Video Distributors (“OVDs”)1 like Netflix, 
Hulu, Amazon, and Apple, are beginning to take on the 
incumbent Multichannel Video Programming Distributors 
(“MVPDs”)2, most notably Comcast, Charter 
Communications, and Cox Communications.  The consumer 
market for OVDs has only recently taken hold, but the 
business model’s viability has led to a vast number of market 
entrants.  This demonstrates the lucrativeness of the service,3
Since its advent, television watchers have flocked to 
online video en masse.  For example, a May 2011 survey 
found that seventy-one percent of Internet-using adults have 
used online video sites.
 
as well as the apparent threat to the old guard. 
4  Nevertheless, incumbent MVPDs 
are not taking this change lying down.  The OVDs have 
forcefully dragged cable providers into the twenty-first 
century, kicking and screaming,5 and these MVPDs have 
retaliated with heavy investment in the online delivery of 
their normal content through an industry-wide initiative 
known as “TV Everywhere.”6
The MVPDs’ foray into online distribution, however, has 
raised a number of eyebrows regarding alleged 
anticompetitive conduct.  In June 2012, news sources 
reported that the Justice Department began an antitrust 
investigation into the conduct of a number of major cable 
providers.
 
7
 
 1. OVDs are “any entity that offers video content by means of the Internet 
or other Internet Protocol (IP)-based transmission path provided by a person or 
entity other than the OVD.”  Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Annual Assessment of the 
Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 
FCC RCD. 8610, 8612 ¶ 2 n.6 (2012). 
  Particularly, the Justice Department focused on 
 2. MVPDs are “companies that offer multiple channels of video 
programming to consumers for a subscription fee.”  Id. at 8612 ¶ 2 n.4. 
 3. Id. at 8720 ¶ 239. 
 4. Id. at 8748 ¶ 316. 
 5. Mike Masnick, DOJ Realizes That Comcast & Time Warner Are Trying 
To Prop Up Cable By Holding Back Hulu & Netflix, TECHDIRT (Jun. 14, 2012, 
7:16am), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120614/01292519313/doj-realizes-
that-comcast-time-warner-are-trying-to-prop-up-cable-holding-back-hulu-
netflix.shtml. 
 6. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8618 ¶ 21. 
 7. Thomas Catan & Amy Schatz, U.S. Probes Cable for Limits on Net 
Video, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 12, 2012, 12:08pm), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702303444204577462951166384624.html. 
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the anticompetitive effects (in relation to OVDs) of the 
broadband data caps set by cable companies, as well as 
instances of MVPDs giving priority to their own online data 
at the expense of these third party distributors.8
Inspired by the Justice Department’s investigation, this 
paper will analyze whether a prima facie case of 
monopolization exists against major cable providers for their 
potentially anticompetitive actions against OVDs.
 
9  Further, 
assuming the cable companies’ actions would not qualify as 
monopolization, this paper proposes theories by which 
liability may be imposed under the Sherman Act, including 
duty to deal,10 attempted monopolization,11 and tying.12
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In order to find an MVPD liable under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, an MVPD must satisfy two elements: “(1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of the power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”13  The Supreme Court has clarified that Section 2 
requires a monopoly to involve “something more than 
extraordinary commercial success.”14  Further, the Court has 
stated in dicta that the Sherman Act should never be misused 
to proscribe competition itself, regardless of its severity, but 
only to penalize conduct that has the effect of destroying 
competition.15
The broad terms of the Act do not necessarily lend 
themselves to fixed, bright line rules concerning the legality 
of a firm’s behavior.  An antitrust analysis must therefore 
“always be attuned to the particular structure and 
  While this explanation was made in reference 
to attempted monopolization, it nevertheless provides a lens 
by which to view the scope of the Sherman Act. 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V.A. 
 11. See infra Part V.B. 
 12. See infra Part V.C. 
 13. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 14. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390 
(1956). 
 15. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
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circumstances of the industry at issue.”16  Consequently, 
these broad terms allow antitrust analyses to adapt to the 
continually evolving commercial markets.17
A. Overview of the Relevant Market Analysis 
 
Analysis of whether an MVPD holds market power, and 
subsequently, whether it is liable under the Sherman Act, is 
based on the definition of its product’s relevant, and 
competitive, market.18  This market definition is crafted 
through an examination of both the product and the 
geographic market.19  The difficulty thus lies in defining the 
market’s scope.  Typically, a narrow market definition would 
potentially find any company liable for monopoly, while a 
broad definition would do just the opposite, undermining all 
the protections offered by the Sherman Act.20
B. The Relevant Product Market 
 
The process of defining the relevant product market 
begins by examining the similarities of the various products, 
either by their character or use, or by their perceived 
substitutability through the eyes of the consumer.21  It is far 
from a requirement, however, that products be perfectly 
fungible in order to be substitutable.22  Likewise, the 
consumer’s use of the products need not be completely 
identical,23 though the way in which the product is used is a 
controlling factor.24
 
 16. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 411 (2004). 
  If this use based analysis were not 
followed, only perfectly fungible products could be said to 
compete in the same relevant market, making monopolists of 
 17. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 386. 
 18. Id. at 393. 
 19. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 
823 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 20. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Law on the Borderland of Language 
and Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-Language Radio Market? A 
Case Study of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation, 
40 U.S.F. L. REV. 381, 445 (2006) (arguing that narrow market definitions result 
in distorted antitrust analyses). 
 21. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 393. 
 22. Id. at 394; Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 917–18 
(10th Cir. 1975). 
 23. Telex, 510 F.2d at 918. 
 24. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395. 
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nearly all manufacturers or firms.25
Thus, it is important to analyze the distinction between 
the use and the characteristics of a product, since a product’s 
characteristics could materially distinguish it from any 
substitute in nearly every aspect.
 
26  Courts have developed a 
workable legal standard that questions whether comparative 
products are “reasonably interchangeable,” taking into 
consideration the products’ price, use, and qualities.27  Any 
product that is reasonably interchangeable will generally be 
included in the relevant market.28
This definition of the relevant product market should 
nevertheless operate within some limits.  Every product can 
realistically have a large number of substitutable products, 
and the Sherman Act should not seek to protect that infinite 
range.
 
29  “The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any 
other product to which, within reasonable variations in price, 
only a limited number of buyers will purchase.”30  
Furthermore, relevant markets may be limited to a specific 
portion of customers, but the limitation must be based “on a 
distinction in the product sold to customers.”31
C. The Relevant Geographic Market 
 
After establishing the relevant product market for 
MVPDs and OVDs, the relevant geographic market is then 
determined.  The geographic market is defined as “the area in 
which the product or its reasonably interchangeable 
substitutes are traded.”32
 
 25. Id. at 394. 
  In the event that an alleged 
monopolist engages in anticompetitive behavior, the 
geographic market is only relevant where consumers are 
unable to purchase goods from alternative sellers, outside of 
 26. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see du Pont, 
351 U.S. at 394–04. 
 27. Telex, 510 F.2d at 918; du Pont, 351 U.S. at 404. 
 28. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
GUIDELINES]. 
 29. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 415 (Warren, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id.; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
 31. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 
824 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 32. Id. at 823. 
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their geographic area.33
D. Determining a Firm’s Market Power 
 
The term monopoly power has been widely defined as 
“the power to control prices or exclude competition,”34 and the 
existence of this power can be inferred when a firm acquires a 
“predominant share of the market.”35  By itself, the size of a 
firm’s market share is insufficient to prove monopoly power.36  
“[S]tatistics concerning market share and concentration, 
while of great significance, [are] not conclusive indicators of 
anticompetitive effects.”37  Even possession of one hundred 
percent of the relevant market does not guarantee that the 
firm has the power to control prices or exclude competitors, 
particularly in cases where there are low or no barriers to 
entry.38
Barriers to entry are defined as “additional long-run costs 
that were not incurred by incumbent firms but must be 
incurred by new entrants,” or “factors in the market that 
deter entry while permitting incumbent firms to earn 
monopoly returns.”
 
39  Although anticompetitive conduct 
exercised by one firm against another may create a hostile 
market, this behavior does not itself qualify as a structural 
barrier to entry.40
As a result, proof of a large market share must be 
accompanied with evidence of the actual or potential 
exclusion of competitors through unnatural or coercive 
means.
 
41  It is important to note that a finding of monopoly 
power also requires a showing that one has “the power to 
exclude competition from the relevant market generally, and 
not just the power to exclude a particular competitor.”42
 
 33. Id. 
  On 
the other hand, if the firm lacks market power, even the most 
 34. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (emphasis 
added). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 37. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974). 
 38. L.A. Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 39. Brunswick, 6 F.3d at 1427–28 (internal citation omitted). 
 40. Id. at 1427. 
 41. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
 42. Brunswick, 6 F.3d at 1426–27 (emphasis added). 
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significantly anticompetitive behavior would be inadequate to 
establish liability for monopolization.43
E. Determining the Legality of Anticompetitive Conduct 
 
In determining whether conduct is exclusionary or 
anticompetitive, it is necessary to consider “its impact on 
consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way.”44  A firm’s intent to defeat a 
competitor in an honest competitive struggle is not considered 
a violation of the Sherman Act.45  The true test of legality is 
whether the firm’s conduct promotes or destroys 
competition.46
Courts are required to consider the facts as they relate to 
the injured firm, the state of the firm before and after the 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, as well as the actual or 
probable effects of that conduct.
 
47  While it would certainly 
violate the Act to actually foreclose competitors from a 
market,48 an antitrust injury cannot be established by 
showing an eventual reduction in competition due to the long-
term effect of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.49  Nor 
can a showing that a firm charged monopoly prices be found 
to be conclusively anticompetitive, as the opportunity to 
charge such prices, over the short term, “induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth,” which in 
turn leads to enhanced competition.50
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
 
A. The Duty to Deal 
A firm with monopoly power has no general duty to deal 
with a competitor.51
 
 43. Id. at 1427. 
  However, “the high value that [has been] 
 44. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
(1985). 
 45. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 
1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 46. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 413–14 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). 
 49. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 n.7 
(1990). 
 50. Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004). 
 51. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 
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placed on the right to refuse to deal . . . does not mean the 
right is unqualified.”52  The Sherman Act prohibits the 
exercise of the right to refuse to deal when it is used as a 
“purposeful means” of monopolization.53  For example, the 
Supreme Court has imposed a duty to deal on monopolists 
whose conduct made an important change to the character of 
the market, and where that change altered a facet of the 
market during a time when the market was competitive.54  
Forced sharing and cooperation in the above circumstance 
has been found to be “at or near the outer boundary of section 
2 liability.”55  Should there be a need to expand this doctrine 
in the future, the Court fears that the judiciary is ill-equipped 
to explain or adequately supervise the manner in which firms 
should cooperate.56  The Sherman Act should not be used as a 
tool to create competition, but rather, to protect it.57  Put 
simply, “[i]n absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly, the [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right 
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, to freely exercise his independent discretion as to 
parties with whom he will deal.”58
B. Attempted Monopolization 
 
In addition to prohibiting anticompetitive behavior by 
existing monopolists, the Sherman Act also covers the 
preliminary steps that would lead to monopolization.59  
Attempted monopolization requires a showing that “(1) [the 
firm] has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct 
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power.”60  Further, this 
attempt must happen in the defined, relevant market.61
 
(1985). 
 
 52. Id.; see United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
 53. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601. 
 54. Id. at 603–04. 
 55. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. 
 56. Id. at 415. 
 57. Id. at 415–16. 
 58. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 (1919). 
 59. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 60. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 61. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 
823 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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C. Illegal Tying 
Tying arrangements exist where a seller conditions the 
sale of one product on the purchase of a second product.62  
The Supreme Court has held that tying arrangements are per 
se illegal as they rarely serve any purpose beyond “the 
suppression of competition.”63  Although still per se invalid, 
the Court has nevertheless recognized that tying 
arrangements could exist for legitimate business reasons.64  
Liability for tying thus rests on whether a firm used its 
market share in the tying product to impair competition in 
the market for the tied product.65  This can be demonstrated 
by a tying arrangement which forces a buyer into “the 
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want 
at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on 
different terms.”66  The origin of the firm’s market power in 
the tying product, legally or illegal obtained, is not relevant in 
establishing the unlawfulness of a tying arrangement, as 
liability will be imposed whenever a seller “exploits his 
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into 
the next.”67
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
 
It is far from certain that OVDs or the Government are 
able to satisfy the requirements for a prima facie case of 
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
However, given the large size of the top MVPDs, as well as 
their control over not only video content but also much of the 
nation’s broadband internet access, the repercussions that 
would stem from a successful antitrust suit against the use of 
internet data caps and traffic prioritization may change the 
manner in which ISPs can regulate their own infrastructures.  
This change, in turn, would affect not only general consumer 
use of the Internet, but the future viability of third party 
OVDs.  Therefore, the strength of the prima facie case will be 
 
 62. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
 63. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949). 
 64. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29 (1984). 
 65. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 34. 
 66. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. 
 67. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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discussed below,68 along with possible alternative courses of 
action for the OVDs or Government.69
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
 
A. The Relevant Market for OVDs and MVPDs 
Pursuant to the “reasonably interchangeable” standard, 
it is highly likely MVPDs and OVDs compete in the same 
product market—video content distribution.  While the 
products are not perfectly fungible on their face, there is very 
little differentiation between MVPDs and OVDs. Both 
products provide consumers with video content, be it movies 
or television shows, and both permit that content to be viewed 
on televisions, computers, tablets, and smartphones. 
A closer look reveals that the services’ similarities are 
more than just superficial.  The largest MVPDs, including 
cable- and telephone-based systems, offer hundreds of video 
channels, as well as thousands of hours of video-on-demand.70  
While a majority of OVDs do not operate using linear 
channels, the on-demand libraries of many of the larger 
OVDs are comparable to, and sometimes exceed, the leading 
MVPDs’ on-demand libraries.71  Also, much like many of the 
larger, vertically integrated MVPDs, the leading OVDs have 
begun to create their own original, serialized programming.72  
Furthermore, both distribution methods are starting to be 
similarly regulated.  For example, in January 2012, the FCC 
adopted rules that obligated owners, providers, and 
distributors of Internet video programming to provide closed 
captioning services,73
The strongest product similarity between MVPDs and 
OVDs ironically stems from MVPDs’ attempt to differentiate 
their products amongst themselves.
 demonstrating the continuing, yet 
subtle, attenuation of product differentiation between MVPDs 
and OVDs. 
74
 
 68. See infra Part IV. 
  The recent introduction 
 69. See infra Part V. 
 70. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619 ¶ 26. 
 71. Austin Carr, Amazon Massively Inflates Its Streaming Library Size, 
FAST COMPANY (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/1830524/amazon-
massively-inflates-its-streaming-library-size. 
 72. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8724–25, 8728 ¶¶ 250, 262. 
 73. Id. at 8670 ¶ 140. 
 74. Id. at 8651 ¶ 96. 
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of the “TV Everywhere” initiative, which permits consumers 
to access an MVPD’s linear video channels and various on-
demand programming through Internet-connected devices, is, 
for all intents and purposes, an almost identical product 
compared to that which is provided by many OVDs.75  TV 
Everywhere is the MVPD industry’s direct attempt to 
compete in the online video market.76  By taking OVDs head-
on in competition, it becomes easier to draw the conclusion 
that MVPDs and OVDs occupy the same video content 
distribution market, even if MVPDs argue against being 
treated similarly elsewhere.77
One can also conclude that MVPDs and OVDs are in the 
same product market through an observation of consumer 
behavior.  Reports illustrate that more and more Americans 
are watching online video through some form of OVD, with 
current penetration amongst the adult population surpassing 
fifty percent.
 
78  Moreover, while at one time people used to 
terminate cable subscriptions in favor of free, over-the-air 
broadcasters, current trends indicate that consumers are now 
exercising their option to terminate MVPD subscription in 
favor of OVDs, in what has come to be known as “cutting-the-
cord.”79  Some reports indicate that OVD users who have “cut 
the cord” now account for nine percent of all OVD users, with 
another eleven percent considering making the switch.80
Finally, the consumer electronic market provides further, 
albeit minor, validation of this market definition.  Television 
manufacturers have uniformly begun to include Ethernet 
ports and/or Wi-Fi receivers in their modern television sets, 
facilitating the consumer’s ability to access OVDs.
 
81
 
 75. Id. 
  While 
Internet-connected televisions provide other benefits to 
manufacturers, like the ability to quickly update firmware, 
these “smart” televisions also include applications that allow 
the direct streaming of Netflix, Hulu, YouTube, and other 
OVDs, which is strong evidence that manufacturers recognize 
 76. Id. 
 77. John Eggerton, Cable Operators: OVDs Are Not MVPDs, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Jun. 14, 2012, 4:04pm), http://www.multichannel.com/ 
content/cable-operators-ovds-are-not-mvpds. 
 78. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8748–49 ¶ 318. 
 79. Id. at 8757 ¶ 339. 
 80. Id. at 8758 ¶ 341. 
 81. Id. at 8757–58 ¶ 340. 
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that a shift in consumer television watching behavior has 
occurred.  Analysts predict that over seventy-five percent of 
U.S. homes will have an Internet-connected television by 
2016.82  Further, Internet-streaming boxes, such as Roku or 
Apple TV, have gained popularity as a means for those 
without Internet-ready televisions to easily access streaming 
content.83
There are indications that OVDs might exist as 
complimentary rather than substitute goods,
 
84 which may 
cause them to hold a market classification separate from 
MVPDs.85  Despite the nine percent of viewers that have 
already cut the cord, termination of MVPD service in favor of 
OVDs remains relatively infrequent.86  Quite simply, the 
recent increases in online video streaming have not 
necessarily translated into decreased MVPD subscriptions.87  
The average American watches thirty-five hours and eight 
minutes of traditional television each week (including time-
shifted television), but only twenty-seven minutes of Internet 
video.88  Moreover, online video viewership is very highly 
concentrated as compared to traditional television 
viewership, with “eighty-three percent of all streaming 
[taking] place among the top fifth of consumers who 
stream.”89
 
 82. Dawn C. Chmielewski, 100 million TVs will be Internet-Connected by 
2016, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:20pm), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2012/03/100-million-tvs-will-be-internet-connected-by-
2016.html. 
  Together, this data indicates that only a small 
percentage of consumers are truly utilizing their OVDs as a 
substitute good.  While there is no hard and fast rule that 
permits the determination between complimentary/substitute 
status, OVDs can nonetheless argue that the nine percent of 
MVPD subscribers who cut the cord is sufficient to 
demonstrate substitutability, especially given the relative 
 83. See Will Greenwald, Best Media Players Compared: Roku vs. Apple TV 
vs. Google TV, PC MAG. (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/ 
0,2817,2402133,00.asp. 
 84. Paul M. Johnson, Complementary Goods, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY TERMS, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/complementary 
_goods (last visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
 85. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8670–71 ¶ 340. 
 86. Id. at 8721 ¶ 240. 
 87. Id. at 8670–71 ¶ 140. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 8756 ¶ 337. 
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youthfulness of the technology, the age demographics of 
online streamers, and the emerging technologies that will 
facilitate streaming services in the future. 
On the other hand, the FCC found that while a growing 
number of Americans are cutting-the-cord, another group of 
television watchers are merely “cord shaving.”90  That is, they 
are lowering their MVPD subscription tiers and getting rid of 
premium MVPD content, like HBO, and replacing it with 
OVD content.91  Reports have estimated the number of 
consumers who cord shaved in 2011 at thirteen percent,92
MVPDs may also attempt to classify themselves as being 
a separate market from OVDs because, in addition to video 
content, they provide broadband Internet service and voice-
over-IP.  While each product could conceivably be classified in 
a separate product market, MVPDs also sell these products 
together in bundled packages, and consumers are more often 
than not choosing to purchase bundles from a single MVPD in 
lieu of separately purchasing the individual products from 
various competitors.
 
surpassing the number of consumers who cut the cord within 
that same period.  Although MVPD subscriptions have been 
shaved, the fact that they were still retained may lend further 
weight to the argument that OVDs are merely complimentary 
goods. 
93  Also noteworthy are indications that 
consumers are purchasing these bundles with the priority on 
broadband first, and video content delivery second.94  Why 
then, should OVDs be found to compete in the same market 
when they only provide a fraction of the product (and not 
even the primary benefit of that product) provided by 
MVPDs?  A court may find the differences between MVPDs 
and OVDs to be as vast as the differences between the non-
automatic and automatic local alarm systems in Grinnell,95
 
 
and such a differentiation may permit the determination that 
MVPDs and OVDs exist in two distinct product markets. 
 
 90. Id. at 8670–71 ¶ 140. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 8672–73 ¶ 143; Susan Crawford, The Cable Monopoly: Very Short 
Summary of 185 Pages, SUSAN CRAWFORD BLOG (Oct. 7, 2012), http:// 
scrawford.net/blog/the-cable-monopoly-very-short-summary-of-185-pages/1631/. 
 94. Crawford, supra note 93. 
 95. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966). 
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Even if MVPDs exist within this bundled product 
market, OVDs may yet compete in a submarket, thereby 
qualifying as a distinct product market for antitrust 
purposes.96  Under the Brown Shoe97 test, such submarkets 
can be determined by “industry or public recognition of the 
submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s 
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, 
distinct customer, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, 
and specialized vendors.”98  The number of distributors that 
operate solely as OVDs, the unique manner in which OVDs 
can be viewed, the younger and more tech-savvy customer 
demographic,99 and the cheaper subscription fees as compared 
to normal MVPDs100
As for the geographic market, research indicates that 
consumers typically shop for MVPD alternatives within the 
limited geographic region where they live.
 indicate that OVDs may in fact compete 
in a distinct submarket.  Thus, attempts by MVPDs to 
distance themselves from OVDs to assuage antitrust concerns 
might be futile if they still compete in the OVD submarket via 
the TV Everywhere initiative. 
101  Quite obviously, 
one would be hard-pressed to find a consumer willing to 
relocate his or her home merely because he or she was 
dissatisfied with the local incumbent cable MVPD operator.102  
At one time, however, relocation may have been the only 
option, as cable MVPDs had traditionally been allowed to 
operate their systems as regional monopolies.103  While 
competing cable infrastructures did sometimes overlap, it was 
generally the exception and not the rule.104
 
 96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
  Importantly, 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Craig Kuhl, Demographics Shifting to Online Video Content, CED MAG. 
(Jul. 28, 2011), http://www.cedmagazine.com/blogs/2011/07/demographics-
shifting-to-online-video-content. 
 100. Ryan Lawler, Over 1 Billion (Hours) Served: Netflix, Big Cable, And The 
Innovator’s Dilemma, TECHCRUNCH (Jul. 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/ 
07/04/netflix-youtube-innovators-dilemma/. 
 101. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8618–19 ¶ 24. 
 102. See In re Echo Star Commc’n Corp., 17 FCC RCD. 20559, 20610 ¶ 119 
(2002). 
 103. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619–20 ¶ 27; see also City of 
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 104. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8619–20 ¶ 27 (“Historically, 
cable companies rarely competed with one another in the same geographic 
area.”). 
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until satellite television became available in the early 1990’s, 
the vast majority of U.S. consumers were left with a simple 
choice between their local cable MVPD and free over-the-air 
broadcasting. 
Starting in the early nineties, with the advent of Direct 
Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) systems,105 cable MVPDs were 
finally faced with a rival that could compete with all land-
based MVPDs on a national scale.106  In comparison to DBS 
providers, which are able to beam their transmission signals 
across the country, cable MVPDs operate in discrete 
geographic areas as they are constrained by the boundaries of 
their individual infrastructures.107  Even today, no cable 
MVPD is able to provide statewide coverage, much less 
nationwide coverage like DirecTV or Dish Network.108
As with the introduction of the DBS systems, incumbent 
cable MVPDs have recently faced renewed competition from 
telephone MVPDs such as AT&T U-Verse and Verizon 
FiOS.
 
109  These new operators face constraints similar to 
cable MVPDs, as their range of service is dependent upon the 
limitations of their telephone infrastructure.110  The 
geographic footprints of telephone MVPDs almost always 
overlap areas already served by incumbent cable MVPDs, but 
surprisingly, the telephone MVPD service areas never overlap 
each other.111
Unlike the cable and telephone-based MVPD systems 
discussed above, OVDs are constrained only by the reach of 
the nation’s broadband infrastructure, much of which is 
provided by MVPDs.
 
112  The current U.S. broadband 
penetration is over eighty percent,113
 
 105. Id. 
 making OVDs closest to 
DBS MVPDs in regards to coverage area by a single provider.  
Because OVDs would likely be found to compete in the same 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 8618–19 ¶ 24. 
 108. Id. at 8620 ¶ 29. 
 109. Id. at 8622 ¶ 32. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  The FCC does not expand upon the lack of overlap amongst the 
telephone-based MVPDs, but it is likely a result of the segregation caused by 
the 1984 Bell System divestiture. 
 112. Id. at 8721 ¶ 243. 
 113. Om Malik, Global Broadband Zooms, U.S. penetration is over 80 
percent, GIGAOM (Jan. 30, 2012, 2:00pm), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/30/global-
broadband-zooms-us-penetration-is-over-80-percent/. 
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product market as MVPDs, a situation arises where certain 
market operators offer their product on a national scale, 
while others are limited to the specific regions.  However, 
such distinctions bear little relevance in determining the 
geographic market for monopolization purposes because the 
test provided by T. Harris Young114 limits the geographic 
market to areas where reasonably interchangeable 
substitutes are traded.115  The reasonable interchangeability 
of MVPDs must be viewed from the perspective of the 
consumer.  In the FCC’s Echo Star merger order, it found 
that, in the case of MVPDs, the relevant market could be 
limited to a consumer’s household.116  The normal consumer is 
almost always fixed at a specific business or household, and 
that region in which they work or live will typically have less 
than a handful of MVPDs.  Therefore, any analysis of MVPD 
monopolization must occur, at a minimum, on a region-by-
region basis.117
In conclusion of the market analysis, OVDs would likely 
be found to compete directly with MVPDs in a product market 
for video content distributors under the “reasonably 
interchangeable” test, but alternatively may compete directly 
in an OVD submarket that may exist under a bundled MVPD/
ISP/VOIP market.  As for the geographic market, the fact 
that consumers of video content are generally unwilling to 
relocate for the purpose of changing providers necessitates 
that the geographic market be narrowly defined; a 
particularly restrictive application of the geographic market 
test from Echo Star would limit the market to the home of 
each individual consumer. 
 
 
 114. T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 
823 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 115. Id. 
 116. In re Echo Star Commc’n Corp., 17 FCC RCD. 20559, 20610 ¶ 119 (2002). 
 117. The inclusion of mobile phone providers (who often impose their own 
data caps) and mobile streaming may potentially change the scope of the 
analysis from regional to something larger.  Current data suggests that the 
average American only consumes seven minutes of mobile streaming video a 
week.  Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8670–71 ¶ 140.  Despite the 
potential for mobile streaming to occur nationwide, this overall small amount of 
streaming usage may be insufficient to necessitate inclusion in the geographic 
market analysis, especially when there is a lack of information as to the times 
and locations where such streaming is taking place. 
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B. The Market Power of MVPDs 
Cable MVPDs began as regional monopolies,118 which 
created an MVPD market that remains both highly 
concentrated and susceptible to a number of anticompetitive 
concerns.119  Although the landscape has shifted over the past 
few decades, remnants of cable dominance certainly remain.  
In 2010, cable MVPD service was available to 98.5% of all 
U.S. homes,120 and cable distributors managed to retain a 
nationwide market share of 46.5% amongst all MVPDs as 
defined by the FCC.121  Given the lack of overlap in their 
service areas, cable MVPDs rarely, if ever, compete for the 
same subscriber.122  A similar story holds true for telephone 
MVPDs.  In 2010, telephone based video service was available 
to 32.8% of all U.S. homes,123 with a market penetration of 
only 15.2% amongst all MVPDs.124  Similar to cable providers, 
the telephone MVPDs also do not compete for the same 
subscriber.125
Accounting for the theoretical nationwide coverage of the 
two DBS MVPDs,
 
126 as well as their market penetration of 
25.5% amongst all MVPDs,127 it can be determined that 65.7% 
of the U.S. population has access to only three MVPDs (one 
cable, two satellite), giving a high Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (“HHI”)128 roughly equaling 3333.129
 
 118. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
  In the 32.8% of the 
country that has access to four MVPDs (one cable, one 
 119. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8626 ¶ 38. 
 120. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37. 
 121. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6. 
 122. Id. at 8626 ¶ 39. 
 123. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37. 
 124. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6. 
 125. Id. at 8626 ¶ 39. 
 126. Id. at 8624 ¶ 37.  The calculations by the FCC assume that a hundred 
percent of homes are able to receive DBS, though they admit that 
environmental factors, such as tall trees, neighboring buildings, and other line-
of-sight obstructions cause this figure to be overstated by an unknown amount.  
Id. at 8624, ¶ 37 n. 77. 
 127. Id. at 8672 ¶ 142 tbl. 6. 
 128. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a calculation of market 
concentration used by the FTC and DOJ in antitrust inquiries.  2010 
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5.3.  An HHI below 1500 is considered 
unconcentrated, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 is considered moderately 
concentrated, and an HHI above 2500 is considered highly concentrated.  Id. 
 129. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8627–28 ¶ 41. 
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telephone, and two satellite), the HHI remains over 2500,130 
still well within the range necessary to raise suspicions about 
the potential monopoly power of the dominant firms.131
Further, regardless of high HHI scores across the 
country, the FCC, in reference to the analyses of barriers of 
entry and MVPD rivalry, has found that the high 
concentration does not necessarily raise anticompetitive 
concerns.
  
Despite this high concentration, the FCC lacks the data to 
calculate each MVPDs’  individual market shares, and can 
only extrapolate an estimated HHI for various regions based 
on the number of competing MVPDs.  This current lack of 
data permits only speculation about which MVPDs are, or 
potentially could become, monopolists. 
132  As stated above, the entry of DBS and telephone 
MVPDs has reduced regional HHIs, one measure of market 
concentration.133  Despite the FCC’s opinion, an analysis of 
barriers to entry seems to demonstrate that the MVPD 
market is noncompetitive.  While reports confirm that 
competition from DBS and telephone MVPDs has eroded 
cable’s subscriber base,134
Analyzing the various barriers to entry helps to 
illuminate the competition concerns in the MVPD market.  
Economies of scale provide numerous cost advantages to 
incumbent, large-scale distributors, both in regards to content 
acquisition and also consumer premise equipment 
purchases.
 it is important to note that cable 
providers in total still maintain 46.5% of the market, and the 
realistic best case HHI is still in excess of 2500. 
135  The capital requirements necessary to 
overcome such hurdles may play a large role in a firm’s 
decision to enter the MVPD market.136  Land-based MVPDs 
would be required to invest heavily in infrastructure to 
compete with incumbent providers.  This is especially true 
when most consumers who want an MVPD service already 
subscribe to such a service,137
 
 130. Id. 
 and where decades of 
advertising and customer loyalty provides substantial “first 
 131. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5.3. 
 132. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8626 ¶ 38. 
 133. Id. at 8627–28 ¶ 41. 
 134. Id. at 8668 ¶ 138. 
 135. Id. at 8643–44 ¶ 74. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 8644 ¶ 76. 
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mover advantages” to the incumbents.138  New entrants are 
faced with the reality that they are not in the position to gain 
new customers, but rather, they must win over customers 
from the existing MVPDs, which requires not only heavy 
spending but the likelihood of an extended period of start-up 
losses.139
Furthermore, many of the largest MVPDs are highly 
vertically integrated, creating a slew of exclusivity 
arrangements between distributors and affiliated 
producers.
 
140  These arrangements are difficult, if not 
impossible, for an unaffiliated new entrant to overcome.141  A 
review of the degree of vertical integration in the industry 
shows that in early 2012, 127 national networks were 
affiliated with the top five cable MVPDs.142  While there have 
been some regulations put in place to prevent certain 
exclusivity arrangements between MVPDs and their affiliated 
content producers,143 there are no requirements that 
unaffiliated MVPDs, much less new entrants, be able to 
acquire that content on reasonable terms.144  The lack of 
ability to obtain more content severely limits growth, both in 
regards to subscriber base and content libraries, of any new 
entrant to the market.145
The current high market concentration, together with 
significant barriers to entry, suggests that incumbent MVPDs 
have significant market power, and potentially monopoly 
power.  An additional factor may give some certainty to the 
determination that land-based MVPDs have monopoly power 
under the Grinnell definition: all MVPDs are in control of the 
broadband infrastructure upon which OVDs operate.  
 
 
 138. Id. at 8644 ¶ 77. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 8731 ¶ 270; see In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. 
Co., & NBC Universal, Inc., 26 FCC RCD. 4238, 4252–53 ¶ 34 (2011). 
 141. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8731 ¶ 270. 
 142. Id. at 8629 ¶ 44. 
 143. See In re Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC 
Universal, Inc., 26 FCC RCD. 4238, 4259–62 ¶¶ 49–59 (2011) (imposing program 
access conditions, arbitration remedies, and program pricing limitations on 
Comcast post-merger). 
 144. Cf. United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 305 (1919) (holding that a 
manufacturer will not be liable under the Sherman Act for exclusive deals with 
wholesalers and retailers who agree to the manufacturer’s terms, so long as the 
terms do not amount to fraud, collusion, or an unlawful combination). 
 145. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8730 ¶ 268. 
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Further, while all MVPDs offer some form of broadband 
service, the data indicates that cable broadband market 
penetration is incredibly concentrated by itself,146 not to 
mention that subscribers who have remained with cable 
MVPDs despite new market entrants have generally 
upgraded their subscriptions to bundled packages that 
include digital video, Internet, and telephone service.147
To demonstrate MVPDs’ monopoly power via the 
inclusion of the broadband ISP market, it may be necessary to 
use a relevant market definition that is based on the MVPDs’ 
bundled packages.  Such a market definition, which may or 
may not include OVDs, has the potential to destroy the prima 
facie case at this stage.  However, taking into account the 
regional cable MVPD’s significant share of the broadband ISP 
market, and still including OVDs in the relevant product 
market or submarket, the MVPDs may be imbued with the 
requisite power to exclude OVD competition via 
anticompetitive conduct. 
 
C. The Anticompetitive Actions of MVPDs 
OVDs would argue that the imposition of data caps or a 
shift towards usage-based billing by a number of major cable 
MVPDs, is sufficiently anticompetitive as to be proscribed 
under the Sherman Act.  In recent years, most major cable 
MVPDs have imposed hard data usage caps on their 
subscribers.148  There is also a recent trend of imposing soft 
caps, which allow users to pay extra for additional blocks of 
data use (known as “usage-based billing”).149  Of the five 
largest cable providers (Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Cox 
Communications, Charter Communications, and Cablevision 
Systems),150 only Time Warner Cable and Cablevision have 
not yet imposed these caps.151
 
 146. Om Malik, The Continued Decline of DSL, GIGAOM (Jan. 26, 2012, 8:26 
am), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/26/the-continued-decline-of-dsl/. 
  Comcast originally had a 250 
 147. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8672–73 ¶ 143. 
 148. Id. at 8732 ¶ 273. 
 149. Stacy Higginbotham, Which ISPs are capping your broadband, and 
why?, GIGAOM (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/01/data-caps-
chart/. 
 150. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 1, at 8621 ¶ 30. 
 151. Stacy Higginbotham, Which ISPs are capping your broadband, and 
why?, GIGAOM (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/01/data-caps-
chart/. 
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GB hard cap, and has recently shifted to a 300 GB soft cap 
with a ten dollar charge for each additional 50 GB.152  Cox 
and Charter, on the other hand, have stuck with hard caps 
ranging from 30 GB to 500 GB, depending on the speed and 
tier of the subscriber’s Internet service package.153
Assuming an OVD user watches streaming content in the 
same manner as the average American watches traditional 
television service, it is possible that these caps would deter 
the consumer’s usage of the OVD.  For example, if a 
subscriber streamed the highest quality 1080p video from 
Netflix, which is comparable (and most often superior) to an 
MVPD’s HD content,
 
154 he or she would be using data at a 
rate of 2.3 GB an hour.155  The average American’s television 
usage of thirty-five hours a week would equate to roughly 322 
GB of data usage a month, not including any normal Internet 
data usage.  Including normal Internet data usage, the 
average user would likely send the monthly usage well above 
the data caps of most users.  For example, the average 
American watches 8.75 hours of YouTube video a month,156 
leading to anywhere from 0.8 GB to 6.5 GB of data usage 
from YouTube alone.157
 
 
 
 152. Shane McGlaun, Comcast Moves to Increase Data Caps to 300gb on 
Home Broadband Service, DAILYTECH (May 21, 2012, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.dailytech.com/Comcast+Moves+to+Increase+Data+Caps+to+300GB
+on+Home+Broadband+Service/article24721.htm. 
 153. Speeds and Usage Information for High Speed Internet Service, COX 
COMMUNICATIONS, http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/policies/speedsusage.cox (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2014); Excessive Use of Bandwidth, CHARTER COMMC’NS, 
http://www.myaccount.charter.com/customers/support.aspx?supportarticleid=21
24#normalusage (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
 154. See Benny Goldman, Dish Network will Broadcast in 1080p, Streaming 
Blu-ray Quality Video Now Possible (But Unlikely), GIZMODO (Jul. 31, 2008, 
12:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5031461/dish-network-will-broadcast-in-1080p-
streaming-blu+ray-quality-video-now-possible-but-unlikely (indicating that 
amongst MVPDs, only DBS providers have, to date, transmitted video at 
greater than 720p/1080i). 
 155. Netflix Viewing and Data Usage, GCI, http://www.gci.com/kb/netflix-
movie-and-data-usage (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); see Janko Roettgers, EyeIO: 
Netflix’s secret weapon against bandwidth caps?, GIGAOM (Feb 1, 2012, 4:00 
AM), http://gigaom.com/video/eyeio-video-encoding-netflix/. 
 156. comScore Releases July 2012 U.S. Online Video Rankings, COMSCORE 
(Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/8/ 
comScore_Releases_July_2012_US_Online_Video_Rankings. 
 157. Broadband Usage Guide, WHISTLEOUT, http://www.whistleout.com.au/ 
Broadband/Broadband-Usage-Guide (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
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While Cox and Charter both have plans with data caps 
above this level, those higher caps (400 GB for Cox and 500 
GB for Charter) are only available on their highest tier of 
Internet service, which, by themselves, cost a minimum of 
$100 and $110 a month, respectively.  For all other tiers, the 
cap is 250 GB or less.  Consequently, across the three major 
cable providers, the majority of their customers would hit 
their data caps upon any attempt to watch content via OVDs, 
as they would via MVPDs.  Worse yet, Cox and Charter 
subscribers would be completely unable to access over thirty-
one hours of content they would otherwise watch, while 
Comcast subscribers would be forced to pay an additional ten 
dollar fee.  The pure limit on usage via a hard cap, or the fee 
required for additional usage via a soft cap, has the potential 
to substantially impact consumer behavior.  The limitations 
imposed on the subscriber by the MVPDs would likely force 
them to use OVDs as a complimentary rather than a 
substitute service to avoid either termination of their Internet 
service from providers with hard caps,158
In response to these obstacles, OVDs should argue that 
the MVPDs are not competing fairly through lower prices or 
superior product, but rather, MVPDs are utilizing their 
broadband ISPs
 or overage fees from 
providers with soft caps. 
159 to unfairly burden alternative video 
content competitors.  It is important to note that data caps 
have spurred certain OVDs to institute changes.  Notably, 
Netflix has invested heavily in compression technology to 
ensure that the MVPD caps do not limit their users.160
 
 158. Data Plan FAQs, COX COMMC’NS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://ww2.cox.com/ 
residential/sandiego/support/internet/article.cox?articleId=%7B2fd6ccb0-b13a-
11df-4be3-000000000000%7D. 
  OVDs 
could argue that, because these caps are near the upper limit 
of the average American’s television watching habits, they 
may not be hindering OVDs competition at this very moment, 
but nevertheless that certainly does not mean that the caps 
won’t be an impediment in the future.  For example, while US 
subscribers have yet to be impacted, Netflix has been forced 
 159. While this note seeks to conduct an antitrust analysis solely through the 
perspective of MVPD monopolization or attempted monopolization, one can 
make a strong case that it is the broadband ISPs who are instead leveraging 
their monopolies in order to monopolize the MVPD and OVD markets.  Such an 
argument is beyond the intended scope of this note. 
 160. Roettgers, supra note 155. 
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to lower the quality of their streams to Canadian customers 
to avoid their subscribers running afoul of data cap 
restrictions.161
If an OVD were to sustain a prima facie case against an 
MVPD regarding data caps usage, the MVPD would bear the 
burden of proving legitimate business reasons for the data 
caps.
  The limitations of data compression and the 
perpetual advancement in video quality may one day make 
data caps entirely oppressive and thereby relegate the status 
of OVDs to that of an inferior good. 
162  If that burden was met, the OVD would then be 
required to show that the harm to competition outweighed 
the pro-competitive benefits of the legitimate business 
reasons.163  For example, in the case of Cox and Charter, 
allowing tiered Internet packages with differing data caps 
may very well be pro-competitive.  This allows for MVPDs to 
legally engage in price discrimination, allowing less 
bandwidth-hungry users the ability to afford a cheaper plan 
with a lower cap, while heavy users could pay proportionally 
more for their much larger share of usage.164  Additionally, 
MVPDs are universally concerned with broadband 
congestion, and by placing a hard cap on users (or requiring 
that heavy users pay more), MVPDs may adequately 
incentivize their customers to limit their broadband 
consumption for the purpose of allowing all subscribers full 
access to a quality broadband service.165
 
 161. Doug Halonen, Netflix Turning Up the Heat on AT&T, Comcast and 
TWC Over Data Caps, THE WRAP (May 15, 2012, 1:52 PM), http:// 
www.thewrap.com/media/column-post/netflix-turns-heat-comcast-att-and-twc-
discrimination-case-39946. 
  It would be 
seemingly difficult for OVDs to prove that either of these 
concerns are illegitimate, aside from the unlikely event 
wherein a leaked internal memo from a major MVPD 
blatantly states that these stated goals are not their 
legitimate business concerns and that the imposition of data 
caps is purely motivated by animus towards OVDs.  
 162. United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 163. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 164. Abby Johnson, Are Data Caps Bad, Or Are They Justifiable?, 
WEBPRONEWS (May 26, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/are-data-caps-bad-
or-are-they-justifiable-2012-05. 
 165. See id.; see also Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and 
Deep Packet Inspection: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s 
Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 641 (2009). 
ASHRAFI FINAL 5/23/2014  12:46 PM 
488 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
Extremely unlikely, indeed, though similar instances have 
occurred.166  Nonetheless, should the harm to competition 
outweigh the justification, OVDs will likely overcome an 
MVPD’s legitimate business reason defense.167
The MVPD would also attack the OVD’s assumptions 
regarding customers’ viewing habits.  While it is true that the 
average American watches thirty-five hours of traditional 
television a week, it is unlikely that he or she would do the 
same if he or she watched television solely through an OVD.  
First, the major OVDs like Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon are all 
based on an on-demand model, requiring watchers to actively 
seek out content.  The on-demand medium may not permit 
passive watching, much less channel surfing, which could 
conceivably result in deflated viewing hours.  Second, while 
the cheaper cost of OVDs may be a partial explanation for 
switching, subscribers who have been willing to fully cut the 
cord and view content solely through an OVD may arguably 
value television watching less than the average American.  
This notion would permit the inference that these viewers 
would be unlikely to watch the same amount of television as 
the average American.  The cord-cutter’s potential television 
viewing habits would then arguably equate to data usage far 
below any cap imposed by the MVPDs, supporting the 
conclusion the MVPDs have not engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct.  Furthermore, any OVD argument that hinges on 
the future anticompetitive effects of data caps may be unripe, 
as it is highly uncertain whether data caps will truly foreclose 
competition.
 
168
A secondary issue related to data caps is that MVPDs 
have, in certain instances, discriminated between their own 
proprietary OVD service and third party OVDs with regards 
to data usage calculations.
  It is possible that compression technology will 
further improve, perhaps massively, so that data caps will no 
longer pose any issues for OVDs.  Likewise, it remains to be 
seen whether broadband ISPs will raise their data caps over 
time in step with the average American’s data usage. 
169
 
 166. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 73. 
  A Comcast subscriber who 
 167. Id. at 59. 
 168. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337 n.7 
(1990). 
 169. Ryan Lawler, Comcast updates Xbox FAQ, cuts reference to its ‘private IP 
network’, GIGAOM (Mar. 29, 2012, 5:32pm), http://gigaom.com/video/comcast-
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streams video-on-demand to an Xbox through the Comcast-
associated Xfinity application does not have this data usage 
counted against his or her monthly data allowance.170  In the 
initial documentation regarding this service, Comcast 
explicitly stated that the data was not being counted because 
it was being transmitted over Comcast’s private IP network 
and not the public Internet.171  After severe public 
backlash,172 the service’s FAQ was amended to remove any 
reference to a private network.173  Instead, Comcast 
rationalized its decision to discriminate data by arguing that 
the Xbox was a proxy for a normal set top box, and thus, the 
data sent to it should be treated as if it were normal video as 
opposed to streamed video.174
The likely effect of this discrimination is that users may 
begin to favor Comcast’s own service over alternatives like 
Netflix once they acquire the knowledge that they can stream 
as much as they like through the use of Comcast-affiliated 
applications.  Fortunately for third party OVDs, the 
discrimination between proprietary and third party OVDs, 
unlike the imposition of data caps, may not benefit from 
having a legitimate business rationale.  OVDs would argue 
that Comcast had the power and ability to create or utilize a 
private network
 
175
 
xbox-faq-update/. 
 to freely stream this data, so they did.  
Comcast’s after-the-fact rationalization, in comparing an 
Xbox to a set top box, may nevertheless pass muster, since 
there would be no reason for a device that functions as a 
proxy for a set top box to be subject to data caps.  Further, 
they may present evidence that this private network is 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.; Brendan Greeley, Comcast ‘Invents’ Its Own Private Network, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jun. 21, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-
21/comcast-invents-its-own-private-internet (indicating that Xbox Xfinity app 
services were being transmitted over Comcast’s private Video-On-Demand 
network as opposed to the public Internet). 
 172. Phillip Dempler, Comcast Changes Language Over Xbox-Usage Cap 
Spat: Same Story, Different Words, STOP THE CAP! (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://stopthecap.com/2012/04/02/comcast-changes-language-over-xbox-usage-
cap-spat-same-story-different-words/ (noting backlash against the data 
discrimination by public interest groups and Net Neutrality activists). 
 173. Lawler, supra note 169. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Greeley, supra note 171. 
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limited only to the Xbox and Tivo,176
D. Likelihood of a Successful Prima Facie Case 
 which are only two of a 
handful of devices upon which Comcast’s service competes.  
Currently, the devices permit subscribers to access the same 
content they would receive through a normal set top box.  It 
remains to be seen, however, if Comcast will expand the 
service to encompass additional content.  If Comcast expands, 
they may have to defend themselves against allegations that 
they lack a legitimate business reason for the discrimination, 
because the discrimination may be sufficiently 
anticompetitive so as to be proscribed under the Sherman 
Act. 
The ability to proscribe MVPD conduct under the 
Sherman Act depends almost entirely on the relevant market 
definition.  The analysis is challenged by the fact that the 
market at issue is in a state of flux, and it is difficult to fully 
grasp its boundaries when the landscape is still shifting.  
MVPDs and OVDs may exist in the same market as 
substitute goods or OVDs may exist in a submarket to the 
product bundles offered by MVPDs.  Despite the arguable 
market definition and any MVPD statements to the contrary, 
the fact that MVPDs have instituted their own streaming 
services is strong evidence that they are in direct competition 
with independent OVDs. 
Further, the MVPDs who have imposed data caps are 
undoubtedly the market leaders, and courts would likely find 
that each MVPD has regional market power sufficient to 
place any anticompetitive conduct under heavy scrutiny.  
Unfortunately for OVDs, there are clear and legitimate 
business reasons for the imposition of data caps, regardless of 
the massive harm they may cause to the OVD industry in the 
future.  There is, however, some shred of hope.  The ability for 
MVPDs to discriminate streaming video traffic, at least via a 
private IP network, likely lacks a legitimate business reason 
and may therefore be proscribed.  Nevertheless, verified 
 
 176. Stacey Higginbotham, He Said, She Said: Is Comcast Prioritizing 
Traffic or Not?, GIGAOM (May 15, 2012, 1:17 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/05/ 
15/he-said-she-said-is-comcast-prioritizing-traffic-or-not/; Stacey Higginbotham, 
The Technical and Legal Realities of Comcast’s Xbox Cap Spat, GIGAOM (Mar. 
27, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/27/the-technical-and-legal-
realities-of-comcasts-xbox-cap-spat/. 
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instances of this form of prioritization have been limited 
solely to Comcast’s Xfinity Xbox and Tivo application, and 
proscribing the actions of one MVPD may be insufficient to 
ease the large burden caused by data caps in general.  
Despite the potential for this small (though not insignificant) 
victory, it remains extraordinarily difficult to argue that 
OVDs would be able to successfully challenge MVPD actions 
through a standard Sherman Act analysis. 
III. PROPOSAL 
Since OVDs would be unable to prove a prima facie case 
of MVPD monopolization, there are a number of alternative 
theories by which OVDs or the Government could seek to 
proscribe the MVPDs’ conduct.  These theories include the 
imposition of a duty to deal,177 an argument for attempted 
monopolization,178 or a demonstration that MVPDs have 
engaged in illegal tying.179
A. Duty to Deal 
 
The arguments in favor of imposing a duty to deal face a 
fundamental issue: that MVPDs have not yet refused to deal 
with OVDs.  The MVPDs have unilaterally imposed a set of 
limitations for business purposes that they contend are 
legitimate (such as preventing congestion and maximizing 
subscriber use), which in turn impacts the competitiveness of 
OVDs.  However, there may be a future cause of action for 
refusal to deal, depending on the development of net 
neutrality laws180 and the potential continuation or further 
creation of private IP networks.181
 
 177. See infra Part V.A. 
  If Comcast allowed others 
to create private IP networks over its infrastructure, yet 
denied OVDs that same opportunity, a court may infer that 
 178. See infra Part V.B. 
 179. See infra Part V.C. 
 180. Whitson Gordon, An Introduction to Net Neutrality: What It Is, What It 
Means for You, and What You Can Do About It, LIFEHACKER (Dec. 29, 2012, 9:00 
AM), http://lifehacker.com/5720407/an-introduction-to-net-neutrality-what-it-is-
what-it-means-for-you-and-what-you-can-do-about-it. 
 181. Matt Peckham, Netflix CEO Takes Swing at Comcast Xfinity Over Net 
Neutrality, TIME (Apr. 16, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/04/16/netflix-
ceo-takes-swing-at-comcast-xfinity-over-net-neutrality/; Matt Wood, Comcast 
has Some Xplaining to do, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com/ 
8301-1023_3-57410030-93/comcast-has-some-xplaining-to-do/. 
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the MVPD’s refusal to deal was being used as a “purposeful 
means” of monopolization. 
Should the OVDs successfully demonstrate that specific 
MVPDs engaged in a monopolistic refusal to deal, a duty to 
deal might be imposed either through the Aspen theory182 or 
the “essential facilities” doctrine.183  However, due to the 
history and nature of the Internet, it is more likely that a 
duty to deal would be imposed under the Aspen theory.  
Under Aspen, the actions of a firm with monopoly power may 
be proscribed where that behavior’s aim is to further reduce 
competition, and where that behavior is contrary to that 
which was the norm when the marker was in a competitive 
state.  Here, data caps may qualify as conduct that 
fundamentally changed the Internet services market; a 
change that only occurred after the acting MVPDs had gained 
monopoly power.  OVDs are therefore required to first prove 
MVPDs’ monopoly power before they can analyze the 
behavior shift in the post-monopolized market.  To do so, 
OVDs would be forced to argue either a bundled MVPD/ISP/
VOIP market or a pure broadband ISP market.184  As current 
data indicates that a significant amount of DSL subscribers 
are abandoning DSL in favor of cable ISPs,185
 
 182. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603–
04 (1985). 
 it is likely that 
 183. In a certain subset of cases, a monopolist’s refusal to deal may be 
unlawful due to the monopolist’s control of an “essential facility.”  MCI Commc’n 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983).  Under this 
doctrine, unfettered control of the essential facility would permit the monopolist 
to extend their monopoly power “from one stage of production to another, and 
from one market to another.”  Id. at 1132.  Unfortunately for OVDs, a couple of 
issues exist in determining whether the abstract concept of bandwidth usage or 
broadband access would qualify as an essential facility, considering the fact that 
the broadband infrastructure itself has failed to receive such a classification in 
the past.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 
967, 1000–03 (2005).  First, courts have typically restricted the designation of 
“essential facilities” to physical facilities like private railroad bridges or 
power/cable infrastructures.  Second, it seems logically inexplicable that courts 
could or should impose a duty to deal under the essential facility doctrine when 
the essential facility in question is simply an unrestricted version of a facility to 
which the OVDs already have access.  While there remains the argument that 
unfettered control of broadband could allow MVPDs the ability to engage in 
monopolization, thereby fulfilling the rationale of the “essential facilities” 
doctrine, any anticompetitive actions stemming from an MVPD’s ability to 
restrict broadband use would, nevertheless, likely be resolved without the need 
to utilize the doctrine. 
 184. See supra Part IV. 
 185. Bill Ray, America Abandoning DSL in Favour of Faster Cable, THE 
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the cable MVPDs, specifically, may find themselves to have 
sufficient market power to fall under Sherman Act scrutiny.  
Thus, if Comcast, was found to have monopoly power, it is 
possible that their imposition of a 250 GB data cap, decades 
after the Internet was first publicly and freely accessible,186
B. Attempted Monopolization 
 
will be scrutinized as having created a massive change in a 
market that was once competitive.  Should the OVDs prevail 
under this scenario, MVPDs may be forced to remove their 
data caps and restore the market to its previously 
competitive, unrestricted state. 
A specific intent to monopolize may be demonstrated by 
behavior that, while facially neutral, has no legitimate 
business reason except to exclude competitors or unnaturally 
grow market share.187  While anticompetitive actions are 
generally frowned upon, the Sherman Act will only impose 
liability when the anticompetitive actions have a “dangerous 
probability of actual monopolization.”188  It is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the acts resulted in successful 
monopolization,189 but rather, that if the acts were carried 
out, they would likely result in a monopoly.190  Not every 
anticompetitive act can qualify as attempted monopolization.  
“It is a question of proximity and degree.”191
Cable MVPDs retain a large market share amongst all 
MVPDs.  Further, their market share in the two-thirds of the 
country with access to only three MVPDs is likely even 
higher.  Assuming that a large market share is not sufficient 
to conclude that certain cable MVPDs in specific regions have 
monopoly power, OVDs may attempt to prove that the 
MVPDs’ anticompetitive actions make them guilty of 
attempted monopolization. 
 
Supposing that the imposition of both data caps and data 
usage discrimination is found to be anticompetitive, OVDs 
 
REGISTER (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/01/27/cable_adsl/. 
 186. Karl Bode, Comcast 250GB Cap Goes Live October 1, BROADBAND DSL 
REPORTS (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.broadbandreports.com/shownews/ 
Comcast-250GB-Monthly-Cap-Goes-Live-October-1-97294. 
 187. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 188. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993). 
 189. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951). 
 190. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 191. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905). 
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would still be required to prove that the cable MVPDs had the 
specific intent to monopolize.  The cable MVPDs likely have a 
sufficiently legitimate business reason for the implementation 
of data caps, but the same does not necessarily hold true for 
their data usage discrimination, particularly if the current 
manner of data discrimination is expanded either in terms of 
the scope of devices to which data is freely transmitted or in 
terms of the type of content being delivered.  Given the 
possible lack of a legitimate business reason, a court may 
infer that the reason for the data discrimination was to 
exclude competitors, and thus, such behavior could 
sufficiently demonstrate the specific intent to monopolize.  
Nevertheless, a MVPD such as Comcast may argue against 
allegations of attempted monopolization by demonstrating 
that their data discrimination currently occurs on only two 
devices out of the hundreds that can receive Xfinity content, 
and the two devices function primarily as proxies for set top 
boxes.  There is also insufficient data to determine whether 
the data discrimination stemming from either of these two 
devices had any discernable, negative effect on third party 
OVDs.  Without that data, it is unlikely that a court could 
find meritorious a claim for attempted monopolization. 
Non-monopolistic cable MVPDs in regions with high 
HHIs may be found to hold enough market power so that any 
anticompetitive conduct would bring them within dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power.  If so, their 
anticompetitive actions would make them liable for 
attempted monopolization regardless of the effect.  There is, 
however, a lack of information about the actual market 
shares of various MVPDs beyond general, regional HHIs.  
Without this specific information, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to show which MVPD would be able to fulfill the 
dangerous proximity requirement of the offense, thereby 
allowing them to escape liability regardless of their 
engagement in anticompetitive acts. 
C. Monopolization Through Tying 
Assuming that the services provided by MVPDs and 
OVDs exist in two different markets, it is possible that 
MVPDs would be found liable for tying their “TV 
Everywhere” OVD service to their MVPD service.  Comcast, 
for example, grants users authorization to use its TV 
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Everywhere service on a multitude of devices simply because 
those users are Comcast MVPD subscribers.  The subscribers 
did not independently and voluntarily choose to subscribe to 
this additional OVD service.  Furthermore, the TV 
Everywhere access is exclusive to MVPD subscribers.  A non-
subscriber would be unable to purchase the Comcast OVD 
service independently of the MVPD subscription. 
Finding liability through tying makes the most sense 
when the argument is framed such that the OVD service is 
being tied to the MVPD service.  Other analysts have come to 
the opposite conclusion, finding that the MVPD service is the 
tied product and the OVD service is the tying product.192
Unfortunately, due to the relative novelty of OVDs in 
general, and the TV Everywhere initiative in particular, there 
is limited data regarding the competitiveness of the market 
and the impact that these potential tying arrangements have 
on competition.  Nonetheless, if courts find that MVPDs and 
OVDs are separate markets, the major MVPDs’ tying 
arrangements would be found to be per se invalid.  If the 
tying arrangement were analyzed under a rule of reason test, 
  
However, there are a number of reasons why such a 
perspective is likely incorrect.  First, the TV Everywhere 
OVD service cannot be independently purchased from the 
standard MVPD service.  While this rationale can be used 
just as well to support the alternate viewpoint, it is important 
to consider that MVPD services were marketed and sold far 
prior to the introduction of OVDs.  Thus, the fact that MVPDs 
were the original product may lend some weight to the theory 
that they are the tying product.  Second, the companies at 
issue hold large market power (and potentially monopoly 
power) in the MVPD market.  There is little data regarding 
the current competitiveness or allocations of market power in 
the pure OVD market, so it is unclear if the MVPDs have 
gained any market power with TV Everywhere.  This 
weakens support for the alternative perspective.  It therefore 
seems likely that a court would be inclined to look at the 
issue from the perspective that cable MVPDs are utilizing 
their competitive advantage in the MVPD market to leverage 
power in the OVD market, rather than vice versa. 
 
 192. Thomas R. Sheran, Is There Competition Anywhere in TV Everywhere?, 
28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 30 (2010). 
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the MVPDs would be forced to demonstrate both a legitimate 
business reason for the tying arrangement, and also that the 
tying arrangements did not have an anticompetitive effect.  If 
they fail to do so, it is likely that the courts would find that 
these arrangements fail the rule of reason test, and the 
MVPDs would be found to violate section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The OVDs and the Government may be unable to 
proscribe MVPD conduct under a standard prima facie case of 
monopolization under the Sherman Act,193
 
 193. See supra Part IV.D. 
 allowing MVPDs 
to continue to act in ways which harm consumers.  To prevent 
this harm from growing and to maintain OVDs’ continued 
viability, a solution may be to proscribe MVPDs’ conduct by 
arguing that the MVPDs are tying their streaming service to 
their MVPD service.  Should the OVDs be successful, MVPDs 
would either terminate their streaming services, or, more 
likely, permit users to subscribe to them independently from 
their MVPD subscriptions.  This would be a great victory for 
consumers and OVDs alike, as a variety of choices in 
streaming providers would greatly enhance competition.  The 
fact that MVPDs even bothered to set up online distribution 
indicates their awareness of shifting demographics , and the 
continuing shift towards online viewing.  By having their own 
independently purchasable OVDs in the market, the MVPDs 
have a greater stake in the continued growth of the market.  
In turn, they may be incentivized to raise, or even eliminate, 
their broadband ISP data caps so as not to hinder their own 
future viability, leaving OVDs with their continuously 
coveted unrestricted broadband access. 
